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Abstract
Social recommendations have been rapidly adopted as
important components in social network sites. How-
ever, they assume a cooperative relationship between
parties involved. This assumption can lead to the
creation of privacy issues and new opportunities for
privacy infringements. Traditional recommendation
techniques fail to address these issues, and as a con-
sequence the development of privacy-aware coopera-
tive social recommender systems give rise to an im-
portant research gap. In this paper we identify key
problems that arise from the privacy dimension of so-
cial recommendations and propose a comprehensive
requirements architecture for building privacy-aware
cooperative social recommender systems.
1 Introduction
Content-based filtering (Billsus & Pazzani 2007) vs.
collaborative filtering (Goldberg et al 1992) have
been dominating the traditional recommender sys-
tems. Typically, users are classified by their inter-
ests and/or preferences based on some similarity mea-
sures. Grouping using these approaches connects
users to each other, implicitly or explicitly. Such con-
nections can create new and reveal social contexts
for users, and can make the system prone to privacy
breaches. On the other hand, the development of on-
line social networks has addressed the need to support
social recommendations, i.e., provide users the ability
to introduce people (i.e., friends) to others or to of-
fer social referrals between users to facilitate network
consolidation and expansion. However, such recom-
mendations are either based on existing connections
or created using social factors in individual’s personal
space. For example, many social network sites (SNS)
- e.g., Facebook (2009), LinkedIn (2009) and Pulse
(2009) - provide a list of “People you may know” for
users to build and/or expand their networks, or to
invite people who were previously unknown. People
being introduced in this way are either socially con-
nected explicitly, or identified based on the similarity
of some attributes (e.g., interests, geography location,
occupation, etc.) This kind of recommendation can
inject many privacy issues for parties involved, and as
a consequence increase the opportunities for privacy
infringements.
In the problem domain of social recommendation,
we argue that the privacy issues arise due to the lack
of choice offered to users as to whether they want to
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be introduced or referred - i.e., consent - and the abil-
ity to control “who knows what about me”. The prob-
lem of choice concerns users’ rights to choose their
preferences and give consent. The control problem
has two important aspects: the who and the what
dimensions - the latter concerns “things about me”,
while the former concerns “things about others”. As
a consequence, concerns about users’ rights involve
both “me” and “others”. Privacy issues related to
the control problem highlight the balance of rights
between users. By identifying key problems that
arise from the underlying rights (i.e., choice, consent
and control), this paper studies privacy requirements
and proposes a requirements architecture for building
privacy-aware social recommender systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 studies the problem domain, section 3 idenfi-
fies architectural requirements, section 4 investigates
privacy issue in social connections, section 5 estab-
lishes social connection privacy preserving require-
ments, section 6 describes system requriements, and
section 7 presents a discussion and future work.
2 Problem Domain
This section describes a motivating example that re-
flects a social recommendation service - i.e., People
you may know (PYMK) - which has been offered by
many popular social network sites such as Facebook,
LinkedIn and Pulse. It then discusses problems arise
from the motivating example to uncover the funda-
mental privacy problem in social recommendations.
2.1 Motivating Example
Mary joined a social network on MySN site and she
received a PYMK list, on which those who went to the
same school as her and those who share the same type
of profession as her are listed, allowing her to send a
message to them. Mary was surprised to find many
school friends she had lost contact with on the PYMK
list. However, she also felt compromised to be on the
MySN because she wanted to keep her professional
information disjoint from her personal social network,
and to keep her away from those professionals she did
not want to network with. She reasoned that if she
saw other’s information they could also see hers.
2.2 The Right Problem
From the motivating example, above, we can see that
if Mary was not asked if she wanted to be on the
PYMK list that appeared to others (e.g., to the public
or to specific targeted groups), then she had no way of
choosing preferences and giving permissions to control
her information privacy. We refer to this problem the
user’s right of choice. If choice is offered, the ability to
consent on the usage of information is then required
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to control the information. In other words, the user’s
right to consent and right to control their information
are essential to fulfill privacy requirements. In this
light, the privacy problem in social recommendations
mainly involves users’ rights of choice, consent and
control. We refer to these rights the 3C Rights (3CR)
framework and describe them as follows:
• choice - the ability to choose to-be or not-to-be
introduced or referred;
• consent - the freedom to give permissions of per-
sonal information usage to others; and
• control - the power to control personal informa-
tion and ways of sharing it.
The 3CR framework can provide a specification of
higher-level privacy requirements to the recommender
provider. To fulfill these requirements, lower-level
detailed requirements for recommender system im-
plementation are required. To discover fundamental
problems behind the 3CR framework, we analyze the
interplay between each right of the 3CR using scenar-
ios educed from the motivating example above.
2.2.1 Choice
Scenario MySN adds Mary to the PYMK list with
people that share the same type of profession as her
and then presents the PYMK list to her boss who is
on the MySN. Mary’s boss sends a friending request
to her and she adds her boss upon his request because
she does not want to be impolite. However, after her
boss joins her social network, Mary fails to maintain
the disjointedness of her personal social network and
professional social network.
Problem The user’s choice of being introduced or
referred will have an impact on his/her information
privacy. In the light of 3CR, a shortage of the right
to choice naturally leads to a deficiency of rights to
consent and control information.
2.2.2 Consent
Scenario MySN offers recommendation choice
options: to-be-recommended or not-to-be-
recommended. Mary wants to expend her social
networks but does not want her boss to be in her so-
cial network on MySN. She knows that her boss is on
MySN. If she chooses the option to-be-recommended
then her boss will know of her existence and might
request friending. But if she chooses not-to-be-
recommended then she will loose the opportunity to
be known to potential social contacts.
Problem Having binary choice options is insuffi-
cient for supporting consent and leads to failures of
information control because social relationships are
not binary: friend or not. Users should have the free-
dom to give different permissions to different contacts.
2.2.3 Control
Scenario The new version of MySN allows Mary to
specify who she will not be recommended to. Mary
believes on MySN she can now stay away from her
boss because she has specified the name of her boss
not to receive recommendation about her. However,
two days later she receives a friending request from
her boss. She does not know that her MySN new
friend Phoebe is her boss’s little daughter who shares
her online experience with her father.
Problem Even though Mary has sufficient rights
of choice and consent, she does not have sufficient
power to control what information is made available
to her contacts - i.e., ways of sharing in the network.
It can be seen that, the magnitude and dimen-
sion of 3CR as well as the interplay between the
three rights have a major impact on the privacy.
We describe the magnitude of 3CR in terms of 3CR
values:
• the range of available choice options,
• the type and detail of consent the user can set,
and
• the level of power the users have in controlling
his/her information.
These 3CR values and the ways they interoperate can
lead to different impacts of the information usage and
in turn the privacy. Since the problems reflected in
these values are closely related to social problems in
social networks, to gain an insight into their privacy
implications, we study the related social problems in
the next sub-section.
2.3 The Social Problem
Given that social interactions are fundamental activ-
ities in social networks and interactions are based on
social connections, the context of a social network is
framed by social entities (e.g., users) and relation-
ships connecting them. In this light, fundamental to
the privacy problem in social networks is philosophy
of social relationships - i.e., the relationship privacy
is attributed as the primary privacy problem in social
networks. Processed in social networks, social recom-
mendations inherit the philosophical privacy problem
- i.e., relationship privacy as social recommendation
privacy.
Relationship privacy involves several problems
that needs to be addressed. In light of the 3CR, these
problems typically are:
• the selection of potential parties - who can be
considered as appropriate candidate(s) to net-
work with; and
• the selection of specific information to share -
who can share some certain information with and
in what way.
It has been evidenced that different networks toler-
ate different connections, reflected in properties such
as types, degrees, directions and multiplex (Chen &
Williams 2009). The way these properties cohere to
balance users’ rights in the 3CR space provides a key
to the preservation of users’ information privacy in
social recommendations. However, the dynamic of so-
cial networks gives users no way of knowing the status
of these properties. Consequently the 3CR problem
in social networks leads to several operational issues
described in the next sub-section.
2.4 The Operational Problem
Information privacy requires users be aware of the
current status of the social network in which they
interact with others. One way to address this prob-
lem would be to allow users to query the network
about self and others. However, to promise a bal-
ance of rights between users, queries cannot return
comprehensive information to the user that violates
others’ privacy. On the other hand, queries can po-
tentially reveal the user’s privacy because they reflect
the querier’s intentions. Accordingly, privacy-aware
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queries need to be constructed with consideration to
the following issues.
• content - i.e., what information can be retrieved
such that the maximum information can be ob-
tained without violating privacy; and
• behavior - i.e., how to query such that the
querier’s intentions that can reveal or be used to
infer privacy are not disclosed while at the same
time necessary information can be obtained as
complete as possible.
While the social problem concerns current status
of a social network, the operational problem gives con-
sideration to the dynamic aspect of the network - i.e.,
the evolution of the network. This can be reflected
in both the content issue and the behavior issue tak-
ing privacy implications into account upon each op-
eration. The key to uncover privacy implications in
evolving social networks is to learn potential ways the
user connects to others - i.e., possible relationships
that can be established. Since each candidate is a
social entity playing specific social roles in the net-
work, they can have different impacts on their social
connections and in turn impact the privacy of those
connected to them.
2.5 Summary
The problems described above suggest the privacy
problem domain in social recommendations can be
divided into choice, consent and control issues, with
the core in relationships. Consequently it requires
an adaptable and extendable choice space, rich rela-
tionship semantics, and privacy-aware queries. In the
subsequent sections we identify low-level challenges
and fine-grained requirements to address these prob-
lems.
3 Architectural Requirements
3.1 Choice, Consent & Control
Our architecture is based on three core pillars: choice,
consent and control (Williams 2009). Users are given
choice to consent and to control their information pri-
vacy. To create consent for recommendations users
need to be able to accurately express their needs.
In addition, preferences for wishes and interests are
preferable because they help to determine users’ in-
tentions and in turn privacy management decisions.
Since people’s desires, wishes and interests are highly
situated and can be multiplex, to accurately capture
preferences adaptability and extendability of choice
are essential. To this end, a capable privacy-aware
recommender will provide users with the following:
• choice options that allow them to
– express their needs and preferences accu-
rately, and
– adjust and change their needs or preferences
to new conditions.
• consent mechanisms that enable them to
– learn the context of their own networks in
relation to privacy implications, and
– specify permissions for using their data and
obligations attached to the usage.
• control devices that provide them ability to
– control ways of sharing personal informa-
tion, and
– verify expected controls.
It can be seen that, the ability to preserve privacy
largely depends on the power to control information
usage. To achieve this, comprehensive guidelines for
privacy protection are essential. The set of principles
for privacy protection identified by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
(OECD 2009) is a good candidate because they rep-
resent as far as possible a global consensus.
3.2 OECD Privacy Principles (OECD PP)
The eight principles for privacy protection identified
by OECD are as follows:
1. Collection Limitation (CL) limits the collection
of personal data.
2. Data Quality (DQ) ensures personal data is rel-
evant to the purposes of used.
3. Purpose Specification (PS) restricts the collected
data to the purposes of collection.
4. Use Limitation (UL) restricts data to be used
within the permission of the purpose specifica-
tion.
5. Security Safeguards (SS) ensures data is pro-
tected by safeguards.
6. Openness (OP) ensures policies with respect to
personal data are open to the user.
7. Individual Participation (IP) ensures individual
rights of actions related to own personal data.
8. Accountability (AC) ensures the principles above
are complied.
Based on the notion of the 3CR, this set of eight
principles are categorized into the 3CR groups and
serve as a higher-level guideline for specifications of
layer requirements. Fig. 1 shows a two-layer require-
ment architecture.
3.3 OECD PP in Recommendations
The increasing number of privacy breaches reported
in the media almost everyday has demonstrated that,
from a users’ perspective, there is insufficient sup-
port for the principles of Purpose Specification and
Use Limitation in existing SNS. One might argue
that these SNS do provide limited access control sup-
port. However, users are not made aware of nor do
they have the ability to specify the purpose and us-
age of their information being collected. We argue
that these two principles dominate social recommen-
dations because:
• The Purpose Specification Principle restricts the
use of the collected data to the purposes of collec-
tion - it concerns the consistency of data usage
and the purpose for which they were collected.
For example, relationship information was col-
lected for the purpose of sending social recom-
mendations - i.e., determination of recommenda-
tion target/candidates, or personal information
was collected for sending social recommendations
and not for other types of recommendations like
buying or selling.
• The Use Limitation Principle restricts data to be
used within the permission of the purpose spec-
ification - it concerns deviations from specified
purposes. For example, the problem of inconsis-
tency where a social relationship exists for the
purpose of social interactions, e.g., a religious re-
lationship is for religious interactions and not for
trading interactions.
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Figure 1: Two-Layer Requirements Architecture
3.4 Layered Requirements
For the above reasons, we aim to address the problem
of users’ awareness with respect to the principles of
PS&UL in the problem domain of 3CR - in this light,
Users’ awareness is about:
• self information and ability (i.e., power to control
their information on the SNS); and
• others’ information relevant to his privacy - i.e.,
users’ knowledge about the social context in
which he lives, i.e., users’ own social networks.
To this end, it is necessary to provide users mech-
anisms to query the network to alleviate their con-
cerns and to increase their awareness, i.e., query-
answering as an essential component of the recom-
mender. With the focus on the principles of PS&UL,
query-answering addresses the problem of user aware-
ness with respect to privacy. In this regard, the fol-
lowing requirements are established:
• at the 3CR layer, users are provided choice op-
tions and consent to important aspects of control.
• at the OECD PP layer, users are provided con-
ceptual guidelines on what needs to be taken care
of in terms of constructing consent and enforcing
control.
– choice, the recommender allows user inter-
actions (IP) for query-answering based on
the provided options (OP);
– consent, the recommender allows user con-
sents set on the collection (CL) and the us-
age (PS); and
– control, the recommender allows user infor-
mation control in usage (UL).
• at the Codes of Practice (CoP) layer, users learn
to situate themselves to better establish controls
using queries that are based on the set of CoP - in
this paper, learning is mainly used to address the
problem of social connections, i.e., relationship
privacy.
It can be seen that, the CoP layer is a new layer
added to the two layered requriements. The purpose
of layering requirements is to allow externality (in op-
position to “pure” system requirements) input such
as law and social norms as higher-level conceptual
guidelines for system design situated at a lower-level
where CoP applies. The role that CoP plays requires
fine-grained requirements of social connection and re-
lationship privacy be understood and specified.
4 Privacy in Social Connections
4.1 Social Connection and Relationship
To learn the meaning of relationship privacy, we begin
from intrinsic properties of a relationship. As we have
identified in (Chen & Williams 2009) relationships are
multifaceted and can be symmetric or asymmetric. A
relationship is symmetric if both ends of the relation-
ship share the same attitude of the relationship, i.e.,
recognize the relationship under the same conditions;
otherwise, the relationship is asymmetric. For exam-
ple, the relationship between A and B is symmetric if
both set the relationship to the same type under the
same conditions. The relationship is asymmetric if A
sees B as a friend but B sees A as a colleague. The
asymmetric property implies the existence of direc-
tion in a relationship. On the other hand, the same
pair of social entities can hold more than one type
of relationship. For example, A and B are siblings,
classmates and both are members of club A&B. The
connection between A and B is therefore described as
“sibling, classmate and A&B member”.
To better understand the privacy issues that can
arise between two social entities, we distinguish the
concept of relationship and the concept of social con-
nection. A social connection indicates two social en-
tities are connected by some reason. Each involve
the connection of two social entities in a relationship,
which has a type and a direction. A social connection
is multiplex if there is more than one relationship held
between the two entities on the connection.
Social referrals naturally introduce indirect social
connections. When one entity connects to another
via a referral, the connection is indirect. The concept
of connection degree is used to indicate the distance
between two entities. For example, if A connects to
B, and B connects to C, then A is said to be 2 degrees
away from C, i.e., the connection degree between A
and C is 2. If there are multiple paths connecting A
to B, technically the degree of A and B is the length
of the shortest path between A and B.
4.2 Privacy Concerns
In the context of social recommendations, we study
what can have an impact on a relationship in a specifc
context. In the following we begin with a set of sce-
narios elicited from a social referral.
Assume that on MySN everyone can refer their so-
cial contacts to each other. In this example M refers
S to X. Scenarios where privacy concerns arise might
include the following:
• If M introduces S to X explicitly, then possible
privacy costs from such a referral include:
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– X knows “M knows S (the latter may not
know the former)” - the existence of the one-
way relationship is disclosed;
– X knows “M and S know each other (i.e.,
there is a relationship between them)” - the
existence of the two-way relationship is dis-
closed; or
– X knows “M and S are connected by R rea-
son (e.g., working in the same department)”
- the type of relationships is disclosed.
• If M refers S to X implicitly by i) anonymity,
ii) using a different ID, or iii) via a third-party
(i.e., the system or another social entity), if these
features available, then privacy costs from such
a referral could be:
– X knows “someone that knows S does not
want to be known to X” (by anonymity);
– X knows “the owner of the ID knows S” (by
a different ID), or
– X knows “the third-party knows M does not
want to reveal his relationship with S to X”
(by a third-party).
In any of these cases, the referrer (i.e., M , or the
third-party) knows that S is known to X.
4.3 Relationship Privacy
Relationship privacy concerns illustrated in this ex-
ample can be encapsulated in terms of existence and
relationship type:
• Existence concerns whether one has a relation-
ship with another. For example, M refers S to X
implicitly because of this concern. On the other
hand, did M know if S had the same concern?
• Relationship type concerns the kind of relation-
ship between two social entities. For example,
sibling, friend and colleague are different rela-
tionship types.
On the other hand, social entities in a social net-
work are interconnected. Social entities can connect
directly or indirectly. A consequence of relationship
privacy between the two social entities who hold the
connection and their social contacts, existing or po-
tential, is extended to access control and distribution
control:
• Access control concerns the kind of social con-
tacts that can be granted access to certain in-
formation, or the condition of building a rela-
tionship with others that can grant access to the
information (recourse). In the context of social
recommendation, relationship privacy has three
main relationships:
– the relationship between the recommender
agent and the recommended agent,
– the relationship between the recommended
agent and the recommendation recipient,
and
– the relationship between the recommender
agent and the recommendation recipient.
In this paper, we give consideration to the rec-
ommended agent - i.e., we consider the recom-
mended agent as a privacy priority agent such
that access control is the recommended agent’s
power to control his information being accessed
by the recommender agent (i.e., to disclose in-
formation about the recommended agent) and
the recommendation recipient (i.e., to know in-
formation about the recommended agent). For
example, does M know if S is willing to make a
connection to social entities like X (e.g., X is a
member of group GA and if S is concerned about
his privacy when having a relationship to GA).
• Distribution control concerns the kind of social
contacts knowing (i.e., the existence concern and
the relationship type concern) or having access
control to some information can also grant per-
mission to distribute information under certain
constraints - e.g., before or after accepting the
recommendation (i.e., accept S as a social con-
tact for some purpose), can X refer S to others?
Can X disclose the relationship between M and
S (e.g., when referring S to other social entities)?
On the other hand,X also got to know something
about M (if not before) - can X distribute M ’s
information (e.g., refer M to others - i.e., reveal
the existence ofM - and the relationship between
them)?
When each of these concerns on each dimension
of a social connection are evident, the privacy issue
tends to be multi-layered. Consider the referral ex-
ample above, If M makes the referral explicitly, the
existence concern on each dimension extends to
• direction - can X know if S and M holds a sym-
metric or asymmetric relationship? In the case of
an asymmetric relationship, who is the dominant
partner in the relationship?
• multiplex - can X know if S connected to M in
various ways and how are they connected?
• connection degree - can X know if S is a direct
contact of M? If not, how many degrees away?
It can be seen that these concerns on each di-
mension can take the problem to a level where more
sensitive and negative implications can be discov-
ered. This suggests multi-layer relationship privacy
requirements (RPR) for connection-driven social rec-
ommenders. The multi-layer RPR serves as a guide-
line for establishing the codes of practice.
5 Social Connection Privacy Preserving Re-
quirements
Given that our aim is to preserve relationship privacy
in social recommenders, the codes of practice (CoP)
focus on the semantics of relationship privacy on four
dimensions categorized as disclosure and control.
Disclosure
This category concerns the properties of existence
(EX) and relationship type (RT). Let P denote a
property of a relationship privacy in Disclosure, such
that P = EX for property “existence” and P = RT
for property “relationship type”. Then, the CoP for
Disclosure are as follows:
• Direction (P :D)
– The disclosure of property P of a symmet-
ric relationship should only be made with
the explicit consent of both parties of the
relationship.
– The disclosure of property P of an asym-
metric relationship should be made with
the consent of the dominant party. If
P = EX, the consent includes the exis-
tence of the relationship and its direction.
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• Multiplex (P :M)
– The disclose of property P = EX of each re-
lationship in a multiplex connection should
only be made with the consent of the dom-
inant party of each relationship1.
• Connection Degree (P :CD)
– The disclose of property P of an indirect
relationship should only be made with the
consent of both parties of the relation-
ship. Such consent includes the value of
connection degree and the social entities
connected on the path between two ends of
the relationship.2 If P = RT , the consent
involves parties on the relationship that
RT refers to.
Control
This category concerns the properties of access (AC)
and distribution (DT). Let P denote a property of a
relationship privacy in Control, such that P = AC
for property “access” and P = DT for property “dis-
tribution”. Permissions for control of property P on
certain information of an agent can only be granted
upon the consent of the agent. Within the scope of a
social recommendation, if
• P = AC
Permission for agent A to introduce agent B to
agent C should only be granted upon B’s con-
sent that allows his (B) certain types of social
contacts (i.e., A) to introduce him (B) to certain
types of social entities (i.e., C). Permission for
agent A to establish a relationship R to agent
B should only be granted upon B’s consent that
allows certain types of social contacts (i.e., A) to
connect to him (B) on a relationship type of R.
• P = DT
Permission for agent A to distribute certain infor-
mation of agent B to agent C (e.g., when making
recommendation) should only be granted upon
B’s consent that allows his (B) certain types of
social contacts (i.e., A) to introduce him (B) to
certain types of social entities (i.e., C). The kind
of the information of interest must be considered
for this property in the CoP below.
Let KI be “the kind of the information of interest”,
the CoP for Control are as follows:
• Direction (P :D) The type of A is determined by
the relationship between A and B; and KI, if
applicable. The type of C is determined by the
relationship between A and C, and the poten-
tial relationship between B and C; and KI, if
applicable. Direction should be concerned if the
relationship is asymmetric.
• Multiplex (P :M) The type of A is determined
by the set of relationships on the connection be-
tween A and B; and KI, if applicable. The type
of C is determined by the set of relationships
hold on the connection between A and C, and
the potential connection between B and C.
• Connection Degree (P :CD) The type of A is de-
termined by the set of relationships held on the
set of connections between A and B; and KI, if
1This code is not applicable to the property RT since a rela-
tionship is simplex. Thus, P :M = EX :M .
2This code is made on the assumption that an indirect relation-
ship is symmetric since otherwise the combination of symmetric
and asymmetric leading to the complex consent is out of the scope
of this paper.
applicable. The type of C is determined by the
set of relationships held on the set of connections
between A and C, and the potential connection
between B and C.
By establishing the CoP above, the layered
requirements can be shown in Fig. 2.
It can be seen that, these CoP provide a basis
to support consent’s construction. Central to the
CoP is the problem of “who can see/use what?”
(WCS/UW). In the social recommendation problem
domain, social entities are identified by their social
connections. Subsequently the problem of WCS/UW
requires the user not only be able to identify the
kind of social entities, but also their connections to
the user. This requirement suggests the development
of concepts of abstraction and granularity, where the
former reflects the level of detail on social entities
- e.g., the abstraction levels of individuals, groups,
communities, organizations and networks are from
the lowest to the highest, the latter refers to the
fineness with which relationship types are categorized
on a certain abstraction level - e.g., friends, business
partners, family members, classmates, co-workers,
etc. In this light, the AC and DT of CoP necessary
consider abstraction levels, i.e., groups - i.e., for
AC:D, AC:M, AC:CD, DT:D, DT:M and DT:CD,
when determining B’s relationship to A and C,
criteria should include groups (if any) to which they
belong.
6 System Requirements
6.1 Component Requirements
Towards the privacy-aware social recommender sys-
tem that we propose, components provide function-
ality to fulfill the requirements established above are:
rights components, relationship registry component
and query-answering components:
• Rights components: Choice, Consent and Con-
trol three components to provide mechanisms for
users to express their 3CR;
• Relationship Registry component to store all the
relationships and policies;
• Query-Answering components:
– Query Library to store queries and permis-
sions attached; and
– Obligation and Permission Reasoner to rea-
son about obligations and permissions.
6.1.1 Choice
The Choice component provides a space for users to
establish a basis of recommendation consents. To con-
struct consents for privacy purposes, choice requires
the following key abilities: extensibility, expressivity
and adaptability.
Extensibility: It is essential for the users to accu-
rately express their needs. In the choice space, users
are given higher-level options as initial suggestions.
Upon selections of these options, users can further
detail their needs and preferences if necessary.
Expressivity: Users’ requirements that can in-
clude short-term and/or long-term needs, and pref-
erences for their wishes and interests, require rich se-
mantics options. From a system design perspective,
this requirement shows the need of expressive repre-
sentations to capture comprehensive requirements.
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Figure 2: Three-Layer Requirements Architecture
Adaptability: Requirements can evolve over time.
On the other hand, with the privacy issue in mind -
i.e., relationship privacy (as identified above) - users’
not only need to be able to express and control the
evolution of their relationships, they may also need
to identify their preferences at different level of detail
for each relationship. As a result, adaptability to al-
low users to adjust their needs or preferences to new
conditions is necessary.
6.1.2 Consent
The Consent component constructs permissions with
privacy concerns and obligations in mind. As a pre-
requisite for control - i.e., the output of this compo-
nent is provided to the Control component to generate
controls - it concerns the problem of fidelity under the
principle of Purpose Specification. As the successor
to the Choice in 3C, it is transited with the problems
of extensibility, expressivity and adaptability.
6.1.3 Control
The Control component manages users’ intensions for
the privacy of their information. It concerns the prob-
lem of adequacy under the principle of Use Limitation.
As the top level of rights in the 3C, it inherits the
problems of extensibility, expressivity and adaptability
from its predecessor (i.e., the Consent component).
6.1.4 Relationship Registry
The Relationship Registry component stores all the
relationships and associated policies. In this compo-
nent, granularity and abstraction are the fundamental
requirements and need to be highlighted. The finer
granularity relationships tolerance, the more choice
the user will have and the more accurate consents can
be constructed, which in turn the more fine-grainded
controls the user will have. This implies adaptability
and extensibility requirements for fine-grained rela-
tionships. On the other hand, abstraction levels of in-
dividuals reflects their relationships to others within
a certain scope. This implication not only stresses the
need of adaptability and extensibility, but also requires
scalability since abstractions can overlap in various
degrees - i.e., when one’s abstraction level changes,
e.g., one can belong to multiple groups where some
of these groups are nested and some are overlapped,
when the relationship between groups are changed
but one’s group memberships remain, his relationship
to other members in these group can change. The Re-
lationship Registry is required to be able to adapt and
scale to accommodate such changes.
The registry serves as a backbone to support the
whole system with central information - i.e., relation-
ships. Each time a new relationship is established,
or an existing relationship is evolved, all the related
information is required to register with the registry.
6.1.5 Query Library
The Query Library component stores all the queries
available and conditions to restrict the kind of users
using certain queries. Queries are constructed with
the aim to assist users to learn more about their cur-
rent positions or potential positions in the network
in terms of privacy implications - i.e., identifying the
choice options available to the user and the CoP for
consents construction, queries look for information
about the user’s control power, and others informa-
tion related to the user’s privacy.
6.1.6 Obligation and Permission Reasoner
To answer queries with maximum information while
committing to other users’ information privacy
preservation - i.e., it is required that the answers to be
compliant with these users’ privacy policies and not
negative consequences. This reasoner serves to fulfill
such requirements. It takes users’ queries, checks pri-
vacy policies of other users that are involved in the
answers, then reasons about
• whether the answers are consistent with those
policies; and
• whether the querier’s obligations and permissions
in relation to the queries of interest are compliant
with his/her policy and intentions to control own
information privacy.
6.2 Overall Functional Requirements
Based on the requirements identified for each compo-
nent in the previous subsection, the overall functional
requirements for a privacy-aware recommender sys-
tem are illustrated in the form of workflow described
based on a social recommendation example as follows:
1. The user is offered two choice options for recom-
mendation: to-be-recommended and not-to-be-
recommended. If to-be-recommended is chosen,
then the following options are provided.
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2. The user is offered choice to query the existing
network.
The user has choice to learn about “who is
around” - i.e., who is in the network and how
they are connected. For social concerns, the
user has choice to query about existence of
groups and their members on their interests and
habits - e.g., who is in his/her profession, who
share the same interests, who has something
in common (e.g., attending the same primary
school), etc. For privacy concern, the user has
choice to acquire knowledge about the social
connections of those who are of interest, as
well as their availabilities in terms of what they
can do and what they cannot do in relation
to the user’s privacy concern. However, while
the user is given choice for querying about the
network, rights of social entities of interest to
the user must also be taken care of - i.e., these
entities’ permissions for use of their information.
If answers to the query will not respect to
their privacy, i.e., answers conflict with other’s
permissions, then such answers should not be
given. The Obligation and Permission Reasoner
is responsible for checking such conflicts and
provide advice in compliance with related enti-
ties’ permissions. The CoP are applied to the
related entities.
Example
A query could be “are there anyone from my
company?” or “anyone in Cooking group work-
ing in my company?”. If a member of the Cook-
ing group is working for the company and has
specified that he does not want to reveal his pro-
fessional information on the network, then the
answer cannot include any information that can
reveal his such information.
3. The user specifies his/her interests with consid-
eration of the existing network - i.e., knowledge
learned from Step 2. above.
Example
The use asks to be recommended to “people in
the Cooking group”.
4. The user specifies his/her needs. The CoP are
applied to the user.
Example
After querying, the user is aware that his boss
is a member of the Cooking group. He does not
want his boss to know that he is in the Cooking
group so he requires to “keep me away from my
boss”.
5. The user queries about obligations and permis-
sions on the existing network and potential net-
work in relation to his consent. The CoP are
applied to both the user and the related entities.
Example
In the previous step, if the user was told that
his boss is not in the Cooking group but some-
where in the network, then he might further
query about “is there someone in the Cooking
group will share information with my boss (i.e.,
someone permits or has obligations to share in-
formation with his boss).
6. The user is notified about potential implications
with respect to his privacy concern. The CoP are
applied to both the user and the related entities.
Example
After step 5, the user is informed that “Member
A is connected to your boss B and A allows B to
view all her connections”.
7. Based on the information obtained, the user
makes a decision regarding whether to change
his/her choices, consents and/or expectations of
what to control. Then, repeat previous steps if
desired and applicable.
Example
Upon obtaining the information from step 6, the
user requires “not to be recommended to the
Cooking group” (i.e., repeat step 1), or “keep
me away from Member A” (i.e., repeat step 4).
7 Discussion and Future Work
The need for privacy-aware social recommendations
has been stimulated by the increasing prevalent pri-
vacy infringements in current online social networks
and the failures of existing recommendation tech-
niques to address such problems. The development of
a privacy-aware system requires a privacy-by-design
approach that necessarily begins from requirements
development. In the area of requirement engineering,
a number of contributions to the work on semantic
privacy issues have been made. For example. An-
ton et al (2002) propose using goal taxonomies to
structure privacy policies. Liu et al (2003) use a role-
based approach to study trust relations and attacker-
defender relations. Giorgini et al (2005) propose a
goal-oriented secure tropos methodology to address
security and trust issues. A common deficiency of
these attempts is lack of considerations of the right
problem at social level.
In the problem domain of social recommendations,
we argue that the fundamental problem is philosoph-
ically the right problem and sociologically the social
problem, of which technology solutions are necessary
attributed to relationships and multiplex of relation-
ship privacy must be addressed. To this end, this
paper presents a preliminary work towards a compre-
hensive layered requirements architecture for building
privacy-aware social recommender systems.
The proposed requirements architecture takes
philosophical and sociological needs into account, al-
lowing inputs from external regulations like legisla-
tion by using a layer approach for requirements de-
velopment. Within the scope of social recommen-
dations, requirements are developed for the central
problem identified - i.e., social connection and rela-
tionship. As a result of lessons learned from exist-
ing social recommender business models such as Face-
book (2009), LinkedIn (2009) and Pulse (2009) that
are inadequate to meet the requirements, functional
requirements towards a privacy-aware cooperative so-
cial recommender system are also developed. Future
work will take steps towards methodologies and tech-
niques for fulfilling the functional requirements to re-
alize privacy-awareness in social recommendations.
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